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DISENGAGING
NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS (NSAGs) IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CASE STUDY OF
THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA) IN NORTHERN UGANDA
By LARE OKUNGU
Regional Focal Point 1 for Africa
South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement
Nairobi, Kenya
Introduction:
The puffed - out pose of a toad in the river does not prevent a cow from drinking the water
-A Kenyan (Luo Community) proverb
Meaning:
States
can flex their muscles publicly regarding international conventions and
agreements that have been adopted by the states, but these gestures may
not necessarily touch the conscience of NSAGs, who might go about their
daily operations totally inured to the threats. Hence, a more
innovative approach may be needed to engage the NSAGs to induce them
into accepting the international norms and agreements. Universalization
must mean exactly what the word denotes, which implies an all-inclusive
engagement process involving NSAGs.
The LRA
A
recent communiqué from Northern Uganda Advocacy Partnership for Peace
(NUAPP) - this comprises Conciliation Resources, Christian Aid, and
World Vision- made interesting reading. The opening paragraph went thus:
"
'Operation Lighting thunder' was yet to yield evidence that the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) has been disrupted or destroyed as a movement. On
the contrary the situation has moved from a stalled peace process to a
very hot war, and as in most conflicts, it is civilians who have paid
(and are continuing to pay) the price for the calculated risks taken by
leaders in the region..."
Four things emerge from a close look at this excerpt:
First,
it is discerned that a hitherto purely Acholi/Langi dominated ragtag
Ugandan rebel group has transformed itself into a runaway movement
straddling international borders (of Uganda, Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) and Sudan). NUAPP claims that the LRA's face is now a
composite of ' abducted, either from past campaigns in Northern Uganda
or from recent activity in Sudan and DRC.' - i.e. the LRA's combatants
are made up of Ugandan, Sudanese and Congolese nationals. There
is hence likelihood that purely Ugandan interests do not motivate LRA.
Secondly,
is the failure of the principals to successfully engage the NSAG in the
peace process (the Juba Peace Process), despite the vast resources
proffered by western humanitarian activists for facilitation of the
engagement process.
Thirdly, one notices the wide-ranging
atrocities visited upon civilians caught in the 'very hot war, courtesy
of the ' leaders in the region' who have a proclivity for
prestidigitation (One would easily recommend that the leaders are
encouraged to fall on their sword one by one).
Fourthly, it is
observed that despite the concerted joint military offensive from DRC,
Uganda, and Sudan armed forces, LRA's pennant continues to flutter
unsubdued.
The subsequent question, hence, is: What really is
driving the 'very hot war' in the Great Lakes region? Three
state-parties to key international conventions/norms - e.g.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Human Rights (HR) -
and the Juba peace agreements (Uganda, Sudan and the DRC) are unable to
resolve the LRA issue despite the vast technical, financial and
military resources available to them for this purpose. These
countries are parties to: The four 1949 Geneva Conventions (which all
include Common Article 3); the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11);
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol 11; and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. These
instruments open the floodgate to assistance for the three partner
states from the international community.
Despite all these
avenues the three principal states caught up in the web of conflict
with the LRA are unable to weave anything sensible and tangible which
would bring the sad Northern Uganda saga to an end. The desperate
intonation in the NUAPP communiqué underscores this helplessness.
Even the international community (read the formidable' white culture’),
with all its muscles, seems down on its knees in the face of the
apparent sheer indomitableness of the LRA. The ' white culture' network
is in an apparent frenetic mode regarding the LRA challenge to the '
West's established peace process template'.
The rhetorical
question still is: What really is at the heart of the 'very hot war' in
Northern Uganda, that has spilled into the Garamba area of the DRC,
following the stalled peace talks in Juba, South Sudan? Where -
or when - did the principal players in the peace process miss the boat?
In
the first place, the general approach adopted in handling the conflict
situation in Northern Uganda was a faux pas: it was not
dialogistic. It was based mainly on threats.
Secondly, it was not dialectical. It lacked local ambiance.
One
and two above combined led to the failure in the 'ownership test',
hence the lack of full acceptance by the LRA movement of the process.
Thirdly,
the conveners of the peace process failed the 'Morphology test ‘: They
never assessed the LRA movement's ' form' correctly. They did
not discern the hydra-headedness of LRA as a movement. They
only concentrated on the military aspects of the movement, without
deciphering the greater hidden interplay of interests and actors – and
failed to observe that political interests could be only one dimension
of the interests' dynamics. The players and
umpires seemed to concentrate on only one head of the
movement that appeared to have a longer neck, without realizing that
there were other longer necks lying low or hidden. They failed to
recognize that before the current spiritual head of the movement,
Joseph Kony, took over, there was "Prophetess" Alice Lakwena, who came
to pass - yet the LRA grew in stature and strength. The
implication here is that there must be hidden forces
driving the LRA movement, so much so that even with the absence of
Kony, the LRA pennant would still continue to fly high. The challenge
therefore is to configure what makes the LRA movement to survive
despite the major odds against it. It would be naïve to simply dismiss
the LRA as an Acholi/Langi rebel group pitting itself against the
combatants of Uganda’s president, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. The potent
question to ask is: Who really owns the LRA? What forces drive it?
Fourthly,
what also weighed heavily against the peace- process package is that
the interlocutors lacked a firm background in engaging NSAGs.
Fifthly,
the seemingly simultaneous peace-process and the blitzkrieg in the
field painted the peace-process as a counter-insurgency platform for
military intelligence- gathering, and hence this created a credibility
gap between the LRA movement and the conveners of the peace-process.
What
solution, therefore, does NUAPP propose for the LRA issue? It
intriguingly states: 'NUAPP urges that efforts currently underway
within the international community to understand and resolve violent
conflict in the Great Lakes region places greater emphasis on the LRA.
NUAPP commends the recent extension of the mandate of United Nations
Mission In The Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), as per UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1843 and 1856, and the Group of
Experts (UNSCR 1857), but urges that MONUC be bolstered to
protect civilians in northeast DRC and that the scope of the Group of
Experts' mandate be extended beyond the current focus on the Kivus and
Ituri areas to the activities of the LRA in Orientale Province.’ NUAPP
concludes: ‘We encourage the government of Uganda to speedily
establish the Special Division of the High Court and prepare to try
Okot Odhiambo.’(The latter is an LRA leader).
In other words,
use the whip and force to keep the LRA in check. Ironically, this show
of force against the LRA continues to fail both as a tactic as well as
a strategy to defeat the LRA. Despite mustering all the technical,
financial, and military resources from the west against the LRA, this
master plan has failed to produce the desired results. The whole
operation has hit a wall. What one observes currently is a vicious
circle of frenzied efforts by the ' White culture' system to re-invent
itself and keep its interests alive in the self-perpetuated
conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Neither the UN monolith, nor the
European Union satellite, nor specific hegemonic individual states such
as Britain, are able to contain the LRA movement nor its activities in
the Great Lakes region, including the three directly impacted states of
Uganda, DRC and Sudan. These combined interest groups have all failed
individually and severally to ' " prevent and suppress" prohibited
activities undertaken by persons or on territory under [a state
-party's] jurisdiction or control'.
These linguistic sprinklings
are common phrases in the language of international treaties adopted
and ratified/accepted/approved/acceded to by state parties, a recent
instance being the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The language in
these treaties largely demonstrates the naivety of the
drafting personnel. Experience on the ground has shown that NSAGs
cannot be 'prevent[ed] and control [led] absolutely when it comes to
involvement in ' prohibited activities'. As a matter-of-fact they can
only be 'talked with and persuaded from' involvement in prohibited
activities, after winning their understanding and gradual approval -
and confidence.
If anything, NSAGs do not always feel bound by
the Laws/Treaties crafted by State-Parties. Nevertheless, they are
often open to discussions regarding the pros and cons of the '
prohibited activities', and can often in principle be persuaded to
adopt positive lines of action in executing their field
operations. They nevertheless need to be appropriately engaged
first. This is where the choice of suitable interlocutors greatly
enhances an NSAG's engagement initiative.
Hence NUAPP’s
suggestion that LRA be whipped into line is therefore misguided and
counter productive, and can inadvertently lead to grosser humanitarian
violations by both camps in the war zones. After all, there is no clear
evidence of concrete foolproof monitoring and verification mechanisms
regarding the on going 'very hot war' in the Great Lakes region. which
can facilitate accurate pinpointing of transgressors. This includes
NUAPP's own mechanisms.
Reliance on what could be mere hearsay must be avoided, as this could lead to deadly consequences in the battlegrounds.
SSN
has a great reservoir of experience in engaging NSAGs in Africa, Asia,
and South America. The lessons learned from the engagement activities
are invaluable. Humanitarian activists can tap into this fountain of
knowledge and experience globally.
CONCLUSION
Unilateral
fiats and declarations by state-parties to international conventions
and other agreements that are inclusive of the dynamics of NSAGs are
failure-bound if an all-round goodwill is not sought and cultivated
from all the players irrespective of their legal status.
Deliberate
efforts need to be made by all those concerned to keenly understand and
appreciate the local ambiance in a conflict situation, and
appropriately involving knowledgeable and experienced local and
international interlocutors versed in NSAGs’ dynamics. For instance, it
is unlikely that the LRA issue is simply a North-South Ugandan
issue/confrontation, as originally propagated. It is bigger and more
complex than that. The concomitant question is: What drives the LRA
issue in East and Central Africa (inclusive of the Great Lakes Region)?
Who owns the LRA issue?
Activities/utterances of 'do-good'
international agencies in conflict zones may not necessarily enhance
peace in those zones. If not properly screened, these utterances could
easily worsen conflict situations in those zones.
Use of 'force'
or draconian measures to enforce international conventions and
agreements in conflict zones may impact cumulatively
counter-productively and not lead to the desired results as originally
envisaged.
Finally, there is need to monitor, verify and
evaluate the real impact (social, economic, cultural) of international
humanitarian aid agencies in conflict, or other emergencies, zones.
This is necessary to mitigate the current trend of high-dependency
syndromes that currently affect the productive capacities
and self-reliance of the populace in conflict and other emergency
zones. All a keen observer currently witnesses in such zones are huge
and expensive fuel-guzzling 4x4 vehicles crisscrossing the terrains
generally amidst humbled, weather-beaten, hungry and deprived, weary
populace, that is even made progressively underprivileged due to the
presence of the plethora of aid agencies. The populace even gets
‘de-cultured ‘ as a result of its daily interface with aid agencies.
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